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THE ENIGMA OF ENGINEERING’S INDUSTRIAL 
EXEMPTION TO LICENSURE: 
THE EXCEPTION THAT SWALLOWED A 
PROFESSION 
 
Paul M. Spinden* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A license has become almost as common for workers in the United States 
as goldbricking.1  Nearly a third of America’s workers must have some form of 
government-issued license to do their jobs.2  This number is almost seven times 
higher than it was just fifty years ago3 and is a striking shift from a time before 
the Civil War when anyone could engage in virtually any occupation or 
profession without a license.4  Today, every state requires some form of licensing 
for an average of ninety-two occupations.5  With so many occupations involved, 
anomalies are bound to emerge.  Morris Kleiner offers these examples: 
 
In Minnesota, more classroom time is required to become a 
cosmetologist than to become a lawyer.  Becoming a manicurist takes 
double the number of hours of instruction as a paramedic.  In 
Louisiana, the only state in the country that requires licenses for 
florists, monks were until recently forbidden to sell coffins because 
they were not licensed funeral directors.6 
                                                                                                                                    
 
* LL.M., University of Virginia (1998); J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City (1979); M.A., 
American history, Missouri State University (1976).  Spinden is associate professor at Liberty 
University School of Law where he teaches administrative law, contracts, and criminal law.  He 
served as judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991-2008.  He acknowledges with much 
gratitude the excellent research assistance of Ms. Melanie Migliaccio and his wife, Sara Spinden. 
1 American workers average “stealing” about 3½ hours a week from their employers at a cost of 
about $137 billion a year.  Bosses: Goldbricking Costs Firms $137B, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 
1983, at 18. 
2 Morris M. Kleiner, Op-Ed., Why License a Florist?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2014, at A35.  Focus of 
this article is on the most demanding form of licensing, referred to as “license,” “licensure,” or 
“licensing.”  Government typically uses it to license persons who pass an examination and satisfy 
education, experience, and character requirements.  Less demanding forms of licensing include 
certification, in which authorization is granted after verification of persons’ education or expertise 
in that field and does not preclude others from practicing the occupation, and registration, in which 
a person merely declares that he or she is practicing, provides contact information and pays a fee. 
3 During the 1950s, about 4.5% of the American workforce worked on jobs requiring a license.  
Morris M. Kleiner, A License for Protection: Why are States Regulating More and More 
Occupations?, 29 REG. 17, 17 (2006). 
4 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 19 (1952). 
5 Adam B. Summers, Occupational Licensing: Ranking the States and Exploring Alternatives, 
REASON FOUND. 5 (2007), http://reason.org/files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf. “The 
most regulated state in the nation is California, which requires licenses for 177 job categories . . . .”  
Id. 
6 Kleiner, supra note 2. 
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While amusing, these anomalies are a reminder that occupational 
licensing7 can be duplicitous.  Its proponents typically defend it as necessary for 
protecting the public from incompetents and charlatans, but the Council of State 
Governments used an old joke to make the important point that licensing also can 
be motivated by the self-interest: 
 
Not long ago the Governor of a midwestern state was 
approached by representatives of a particular trade anxious to enlist the 
Governor’s support in securing passage of legislation to license their 
trade. 
“Governor,” the men said, “passage of this licensing act will 
ensure that only qualified people will practice this occupation; it will 
eliminate charlatans, incompetents or frauds; and it will thereby protect 
the safety and welfare of the people of this state.” 
The Governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical.  
“Gentlemen,” he asked, “are you concerned with advancing the health, 
safety and welfare of the people under the police powers of this state, 
or are you primarily interested in creating a monopoly situation to 
eliminate competition and raise prices?” 
The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said, 
“Governor, we’re interested in a little of each.”8 
 
The joke’s punch-line highlights the significant economic and social benefits that 
result from attaching a mandatory license to an occupation.9 
Even with monetary benefits to be reaped from licensing, American 
engineers have been surprisingly ambivalent toward licensing, if not outright 
rejecting of it.  In a striking enigma, an overwhelming majority of engineers—
somewhere around eighty percent10—do not pursue licensing as a professional 
                                                                                                                                    
 
7 The term “occupational licensing” includes licensing of the professions, such as law and 
medicine, and occupation groups, such as barbers. 
8 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 1. 
9 Kleiner, in a study conducted with Alan B. Krueger, concluded that requiring a licensing for an 
occupation can increase salaries by as much as fifteen percent.  Kleiner, supra note 2.  For a survey 
of literature on the issue of occupational licensing’s economic benefits, see REED NEIL OLSEN, The 
Regulation of Medical Professions, in 5870 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. & ECON. 1018-54 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert et al. eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/58 
70book.pdf.  
10 This figure represents a consensus.  See, e.g., M. J. Kolhoff, For the Industry Exemption . . ., in 
ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 526, 526-27 (James H. Schaub et al. eds., 1983); Craig 
Musselman, The 80% Myth in the Engineering Profession, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS (Sept. 
13, 2010), http://community.nspe.org/blogs/licensing/archive/2010/09/13/the-80-myth-in-the-
engineering-profession.aspx.  In 2001, the California Society of Professional Engineers published a 
1995 estimate prepared by the National Council of Examiners of Engineering and Surveying 
(NCEES) that reported approximately 2.2 million engineers practicing in the United States and that 
approximately 400,000 of them, or eighteen percent, were licensed.  An Introduction to 
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engineer.11  But even more befuddling is why the states, every one of which 
requires a license to practice engineering,12 allow the lion’s share of engineering 
to be done by unlicensed persons, especially in light of the state’s assertion that 
engineering licenses are necessary for the public’s protection.13  Every state 
exempts from licensure engineers whose practices fit within one or more of five 
categories: (1) engineers working under the supervision of a licensed engineer 
who takes responsibility for the unlicensed engineer’s work; (2) engineers 
employed by public utilities; (3) engineers employed by the federal government; 
(4) engineers employed by a state government; and (5) “in-house” engineers 
employed by a manufacturing or other business firm (known as the “industrial 
exemption”).14 
The policy underlying these exemptions, especially the industrial 
exemption, is perplexing.  It begs the question of how an engineer’s working for 
an industrial firm protects the public and makes licensing  unnecessary.  No state 
exempts a lawyer or physician from licensure simply because he or she is 
employed by the government or a corporation.  How does a state justify requiring 
a florist to have a license, no matter where he or she works,15 but does not require 
                                                                                                                                    
 
Professional Engineering Licensing in California and Other States, CAL. SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS 3 
(2001), http://www.cspe.com/GovtAffairs/TitleActStudy.pdf.  The engineering specialty in which 
the largest number of practitioners were licensed, according to the NCEES statistics, was civil 
engineering.  Id.  Forty-four percent of civil engineers were licensed.  Id.  In the other engineering 
specialties, twenty-three percent of mechanical engineers were licensed; nine percent of electrical 
engineers; eight percent of chemical engineers; eight percent of industrial engineers; thirteen 
percent of agricultural engineers; and seventeen percent of mining and metallurgical engineers.  Id.  
11 The designation “professional engineer” in the profession refers to those engineers who have 
obtained licensure.  See Karen Chassie, The PE License: Certifying Competence, IEEE 
POTENTIALS, Aug./Sept. 2001, at 14. 
12 “Engineering” is defined variously by the states.  They typically define it very broadly as 
providing, for remuneration, any service or creative work that entails application of engineering 
principles and principles of mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences.  The definition 
applied by state governments in regulating engineers typically employ a much broader, all-
encompassing definition. 
13 For example, the New Hampshire Board of Professional Engineers asserts on its website that the 
board’s purpose is “to regulate the practice of Professional Engineering in this State to safeguard 
life, health, property, and to promote public welfare.” Welcome to the NH Board of Professional 
Engineers, ST. N. H. BOARD PROF. ENGINEERS, http://www.nh.gov/jtboard/pe.htm (last visited Oct. 
13, 2014).  The Kentucky Board of Engineers and Land Surveyors asserts on its website that the 
state’s engineering licensing law was enacted in 1938 “to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare.”  About Us, KY. BOARD ENGINEERS & LAND SURVEYORS (2012), 
http://kyboels.ky.gov/Pages/default.aspx. 
14 See Demonstrating Qualifying Engineering Expereince for Licensure, Nat’l Soc’y prof. 
Engineers, (July 28, 2007), http://www.nspe.org/resources/licensure/resources/demonstrating-
qualifying-engineering-experience-licensure. 
15 Since 1936, Louisiana has required florists to be licensed.  Dick M. Carpenter II, Testing the 
Utility of Licensing: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Occupational Regulation, 13 J. APPLIED 
BUS. & ECON. 28, 30 (2012).  The requirement is set out in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3808 (2014).  
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an engineer, whose negligence can kill,16 to obtain a license simply because he or 
she works for an industrial firm? 
As incompatible with protecting the public as the industrial exemption 
seems to be, the courts have made clear that the states are free to persist in such 
policies.  In such matters as licensing, the states have virtually unfettered 
discretion.  The United States Supreme Court has declared that regulatory 
licensing is one the government’s strongest powers to be wielded as it deems 
necessary for protecting society.17 
Even if the policy of the exemptions does not violate due process rights, 
it is difficult to defend as good government.  Indeed, the exemptions raise 
suspicions that their enactment had more to do with politics—protecting the 
private interests of industrial firms and others—than with good government.18  
Unlike any other profession, engineering has always been dominated by large 
industrial interests, which often have much political power.19  Although engineers 
provided the genius and ingenuity for America’s industrialization, they did so as 
employees of business entities and entrepreneurs.  Little has changed.  As Edwin 
Layton observed, engineering has always involved an attempt—with mixed 
success—to blend science and business.  “[T]he test of an engineer’s work,” he 
said, “lies not in the laboratory, but in the marketplace.”20  Engineers’ success has 
always been tied to industry’s success,21 and today the overwhelming majority of 
engineers—as many as ninety percent22—work for large manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                    
 
In 2010, the legislature abolished the four-hour subjectively-judged demonstration section of the 
floral exam, but a written exam still is required.  Jacob Sullum, A Victory for Floral Freedom in 
Louisiana, REASON.COM (July 12, 2010, 12:52 PM), http://www.reason.com/blog/2010/07/12/a-
victory-for-floral-freedom-i. 
16 Doug McGuirt notes two major disasters attributed to “engineering oversights” that motivated 
legislators to enact engineering licensing laws.  Doug McGuirt, The Professional Engineering 
Century, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS (June 2007), at 24-29.  These disasters were the 1928 
collapse of the St. Francis Dam near Los Angeles that killed more than 500 persons and the 1937 
school explosion in New London, Texas, that killed about 300 persons.  Id. 
17 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
18 See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 
(1971) (“The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every 
industry in the society.  With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can 
and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries.”) (emphasis added). 
19 EDWIN T. LAYTON, JR., THE REVOLT OF THE ENGINEERS: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
AMERICAN ENGINEERING PROFESSION ch. 1 (1986).  Only large organizations could take advantage 
of engineers’ knowledge of science because “large works are more likely to involve complexities 
than are small ones; and the larger the project, the more likely it is that such difficulties will 
transcend the capabilities of artisans and businessmen.”  Id. at 2. 
20 Id. at 1. 
21 ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:  AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 
156 (1988). 
22 Carl Nelson & Susan Peterson, Ethical Decisions for Engineers:  Systematic Avoidance and the 
Need for Confrontation, in ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 330, 334 (James H. Schaub 
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businesses, exempting them from licensure in states recognizing an industrial 
exemption.23 
This article probes the soundness of the policy underlying the industrial 
exemption.  It concludes that, although emergence of the exemption was a natural 
consequence of engineering’s close alliance from the very start with big business, 
the exemption has thwarted engineering’s development as a bona fide profession.  
It also concludes that only with elimination or a significant reengineering of the 
exemption can the profession truly expect to attain profession status.  Such a 
rethinking about the exemption will come only with a major change in attitude by 
engineering practitioners as to what it means to be an engineer. 
The article begins its probe in Part II with a brief history of engineering 
licensing.  This section identifies the primary factors that spurred the sudden 
push for engineering licensing at the beginning of the 20th Century and concludes 
that it resulted from two major instigators.  One was the Progressive reform 
movement, which pushed for bureaucratic regulation as the solution to the 
dangers emerging from the nation’s rapid industrialization and urbanization.  The 
Progressives sought licensing as a means for protecting the public from 
incompetents and charlatans.  The other motivating force was an awakening by 
some engineering leaders to the economic benefits to be reaped from licensure.  
Finally, the section traces the backlash by industry, engineering’s close partner, 
to licensing that resulted in the industrial exemption.  Part III focuses on the 
policy and rationale underlying the industrial exemption.  It considers the defense 
of the industrial exemption articulated by an engineer working in industry, M. J. 
Kolhoff, and rejects his arguments as untenable, resting politics and monetary 
self-interest of powerful business firms that employed large contingencies of 
engineers.  Moreover, it concludes that the exemption has been a significant 
factor, coupled with lack of control of engineering by engineers in industry, for 
relegating engineering to a mere occupation group status.  Finally, Part IV 
endeavors to show that the industrial exemption is dangerous to engineering 
because it facilitates business-controlled engineering, which has been a 
significant factor in some major disasters and failures, including the 1986 
Challenger disaster and the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  It also 
asserts that the industrial exemption is dangerous for engineering because it has 
necessarily meant engineers’ loss of control of industrial engineering and has 
contributed to a change in attitude concerning personal responsibilities.  If 
engineering is ever to achieve profession status, the root cause of its relegation to 
a mere occupation group, the industrial exemption must be eliminated or 
significantly pared. 
                                                                                                                                    
 
et al., eds., 1983); see also ROBERT J. BAUM, ETHICS AND ENGINEERING CURRICULA 15 (1980).  
Elliott Krause puts the number at eighty-five percent.  ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS:  
PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 61 (1999). 
23 Eligibility for an exemption can depend on the exemption statute’s wording. 
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II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENGINEERING LICENSURE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
Occupational licensing in general did not become a significant facet of 
American society until the closing years of the 19th Century.24  Before then, only 
practitioners of the “learned professions” of law and medicine required a 
government-issued license.25  By the years before the Civil War, when engineers 
were just beginning to emerge as an occupation group, licensing had lost much of 
its significance.  Not only did licensing seem inconsistent with the Jacksonian 
democracy ideals that dominated early 19th Century thought, but the Civil War 
shook the nation into a reconsideration of its basic institutions—even rethinking 
what it meant to be a nation.  Norman Spaulding explained that this national 
introspection caused the professions, even the most highly respected practice of 
law, to retreat “to organizational structures that provided collective, less directly 
political, venues in which to secure professional authority.”26  In the respite of the 
post-war years, the occupations, even law and medicine, were wide open to most 
anyone. 
During this time, the nation’s industrialization gave rise to the 
forerunners of today’s engineers.  From the beginning—and it has never 
changed—engineering was closely tied to industrial interests.  Engineering 
emerged in the 19th Century in response to industry’s call for scientific 
knowledge in the development of steamboats, steam engines, locomotives, 
canals, and the like.27  The first engineers were a tiny cadre of experts who 
practiced what was then called the “mechanics arts,” which involved applying 
scientific principles to industrial products.28  These experts worked almost 
exclusively as employees of large-scale business organizations and the military.29  
Large outfits were the only ones that could afford to employ them.  Small firms 
did not have the resources to deal in the products that needed their expertise.30  
Engineering’s close alliance with big business became a persistent theme of the 
profession that endures today. 
                                                                                                                                    
 
24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 16-17. 
25 Douglas A. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 46, 46 (1972). 
26 Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2094 (2005).  Spaulding 
asserts that the nation’s constitutional crisis spilled over into a question of even law’s legitimacy, 
causing a retreat of the venerable legal profession.  Id. 
27 Bruce Sinclair, Episodes in the History of the American Engineering Profession, in THE 
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127, 128-29 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988). 
28 Id. at 128-30. 
29 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 2. 
30 Id. 
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A.  Early Years of Licensing 
 
During the 17th and early 18th centuries, only physicians and lawyers had 
to have a license to do their jobs.31  Restrictive licensing for medicine and law 
began to disappear during the early 19th Century32.  The waning of these 
professions came at the hands of reformers, caught up in the zeal of the 
Jacksonian era (from about 1820 to 1845) to equalize American society by 
opening the professions to the masses.33  By 1850, licensing of physicians had 
ended entirely.34  Practitioners of alternative medicine, especially homeopathy,35 
increased in number and gained popularity, notably garnering the support of 
well-to-do and politically powerful individuals.36  The homeopaths were able to 
leverage this popularity into achieving repeal of licensing laws that restricted the 
practice of medicine to “regulars,” or physicians of traditional remedies of 
bleeding and mercury-based cathartics.37  Only vestiges of licenses for lawyers 
remained at the middle of the 19th Century.  In 1851, for example, Indiana’s new 
constitution opened the practice of law to everyone by providing that “[e]very 
person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to 
practice law in all courts of justice.”38  About the only governmental restraint on 
the practice of law anywhere by 1850 was passage of an examination 
administered by a court, usually the local trial court, and a number of states did 
not require even that.39 
                                                                                                                                    
 
31 Wallace, supra note 25, at 46. 
32 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
33 See Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen and the Professions as a 
Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 33, 40 (2012). 
34 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 18. 
35 “[H]omeopathy is premised on four cardinal principles:  (1) most diseases are attributed to an 
infectious disorder known as the psora (itch); (2) the body contains a spiritual force (vitalism) 
which directs its own healing process; (3) remedies are discerned by giving healthy patients 
repeated doses of many common remedies and recording the symptoms they produce (proving), 
then applying those substances, in highly diluted doses, to conditions with those symptoms (Law of 
Similars); and (4) remedies become more effective with greater dilution (Law of Infinitesimals) and 
become more diluted when shaken or agitated (potentizing).”  Patrick L. Sheldon, The Truth About 
Homeopathy:  A Discussion of the Practice and the Dangers that Inhere, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
L.J. 289, 290-91 (2005). 
36 Homeopathic physicians gained popularity among “wealthy and cultured Americans who 
objected to the ‘sledgehammer’ doses of medicines then in vogue.”  JOHN S. HALLER, JR., A 
PROFILE IN ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: THE ECLECTIC MEDICAL COLLEGE OF CINCINNATI 19 (1999). 
37 Robert L. Numbers, The Fall and Rise of the American Medical Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 51, 54 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988).  See also HALLER, supra note 36, at 19. 
38 Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 33, 35 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988) (citation omitted). 
39 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 19. 
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Licensing’s virtual disappearance by the Civil War has been described as 
a “remarkable reversal.”40  In addition to the Jacksonian reformers’ push for 
opening the professions to everyone and the political power gained by 
“outsiders,” the Council of State Governments has identified three other factors 
that precipitated rejection of occupational licensing during this period.  They 
were:  (1) governments’ adoption of a laissez-faire policy toward the growing 
industrial sector; (2) a shortage of professionals to serve the nation’s exploding 
population; and (3) a preference for decentralized government in the new, 
unsettled areas, which typically resulted in loose regulatory standards for 
business and occupations.41 
During this time of laissez-faire, the number of engineers remained 
small.  Between 1816 and 1850, the number of engineers in the United States 
grew from an estimated thirty to 2,000.42  Nearly all of their work involved canal 
building and railroad construction, and such projects were where individuals 
gained their skills and knowledge in the mechanic arts—through on-the-job 
training.43  Sunny Auyang describes these early engineers as mostly uneducated 
and from the lower classes of society.44  “Even among leading engineers . . .,” 
Auyang says, “[t]he majority had been apprenticed to millwrights, barbers, 
carpenters, stone masons, instrument makers. Because of their humble origins, 
these pioneering engineers were often stereotyped as craftsmen incapable of 
scientific reasoning.”45 
As technology incorporated scientific principles, it gradually moved 
beyond the capabilities of an artisan or businessman whose limited understanding 
of science and physics could not keep pace.  Institutions and specialty schools 
began springing up around the country to fill the gap and to supplant on-the-job 
training.46  The Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, and the 
Maryland Mechanics’ Institute, both established in 1824, were among the first to 
offer programs intended to transform the old workforce into technicians through 
night classes and magazines.47  These casual educational endeavors were 
unsuccessful because lessons had to be taught on such a basic level that they had 
little value for on-the-job application.48  What was needed was not knowledge of 
science and physics as much as understanding of its methods.49  Engineering took 
                                                                                                                                    
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 3. 
43 Id. 
44 SUNNY Y. AUYANG, ENGINEERING—AN ENDLESS FRONTIER 115 (2004). 
45 Id. 
46 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 129. 
47 Id. at 129-30. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 130. 
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on an emphasis on application—on form and method.50  After a coalition of 
scientists and industrialists gained control of the Franklin Institute in 
Philadelphia, it initiated in 1836 a new curriculum to train engineers in these 
methods, and it became one of the first successful programs.51  The institute’s 
curriculum laid the foundation for development of formal, full-time, university-
level engineering education and a decided shift away from apprenticeship 
training.52  Molded by the collaborative work of scientists and industrialists, 
engineering began to take definite shape.  Bruce Sinclair has observed that 
“scientists saw career opportunities in teaching, research, and publication, while 
the entrepreneurs visualized greater profits from an applied-science-based 
industry . . . .”53  At times, either the science side or the entrepreneur side of the 
coalition dominated, setting off an incessant debate over whether engineering 
should be more science or more art or application.54 
Before the Civil War, other privately-funded institutions began to offer 
programs similar to the Franklin Institute’s offering.55  In 1862, the Morrill Act 
provided funding for public agricultural and mechanical colleges, and public 
institutions began offering courses in civil, mechanical, mining, and chemical 
engineering.56  By 1896, an engineering student could choose from 110 colleges 
offering an engineering curriculum, and the number of students skyrocketed from 
around 1,000 in 1890 to around 10,000 in 1900.57 
As deaths resulting from failure of the industrial revolution’s machinery 
mounted,58 the profession’s leaders resolved that the profession should police 
itself through formation of engineering societies.  Civil engineers organized 
societies of local engineers in Boston (1848), New York (1852), St. Louis (1868), 
and Chicago (1869).59  In 1869, the New York society morphed into the 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), which began pushing for attaining 
recognition of engineering as a learned professional on par with medicine and 
                                                                                                                                    
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 132. 
53 Id. at 132-33. 
54 See LAYTON, supra note 19, at 26-27. 
55 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 131. 
56 Id. 
57 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 4. 
58 For example, boilers exploded routinely, reaching a rate of about 400 a year by 1900.  AUYANG, 
supra note 44, at 292.  In 1865, about 1,700 passengers of the steamboat Sultana, mostly Union 
soldiers returning home from Confederate prison camps, were killed when the vessel’s boiler 
exploded on the Mississippi River.  Miss. Historical Soc’y, Surviving the Worst: The Wreck of the 
Sultana at the End of the American Civil War, http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/319/ 
surviving-the-worst-the-wreck-of-the-sultana (visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
59 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 29.  Although the New York society called itself the American 
Society of Civil Engineers, it functioned as an organization for New York engineers.  Id. 
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law.60  At about the same time, mining engineers organized the American 
Institute of Mining Engineers (AIME), which functioned principally as an arm of 
the mining and metals industries.61  Engineers continued to organize regional 
societies, but ASCE’s and AIME’s formation and function as national societies 
began to overshadow the regional organizations.62 
ASCE began setting the pace for moving engineering into profession 
status.  Its membership requirements were higher than other societies: members 
had to have practiced engineering for five years and “be in charge of engineering 
work.”63  Those requirements were upped in 1891 to having ten years of practice, 
being in charge of engineering for at least five years, and being able to do design 
work.64  These high standards, however, became a stumbling block to ASCE’s 
supplanting regional societies and specialty groups.  Unable to meet ASCE’s 
requirements, engineers either broke off into splinter groups or worked 
exclusively with local societies.65 
Engineers working in industry, however, provoked the most difficult 
internal problems for ASCE.  These individuals dubbed themselves as 
mechanical engineers, but often they were only glorified plant managers or 
superintendents with little or no formal engineering training.66  ASCE leadership 
began to loath the close affiliation such engineers had with industry and initiated  
toward the end of the 19th Century a fight for engineering’s independence from 
industry’s control.67  It understood, however, that outside influence exerted by the 
likes of railroads and other major industrial firms had to be appeased, which 
frequently led to compromises concerning ASCE policies.68  Concerning the 
ASCE’s attempts to attain profession status for engineering at the time, Edwin 
Layton observed: 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, leaders of the ASCE 
viewed the progress of their society with a satisfaction bordering on 
complacency.  The success of the ASCE rested on its very high 
professional standards of membership and the diversity of occupational 
roles open to civil engineers.  Corporation employees were not in 
ascendency; nor was any single industry dominant.  Presidents of the 
ASCE took a high degree of professional autonomy for granted.  They 
depreciated the disagreements between civil engineers serving as expert 
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witnesses before the courts and suggested, instead, that the professional 
engineer ought to serve the courts themselves rather than the litigants.  
Such a role implied that engineers should be independent of specific 
commercial interests.69 
 
The nemesis of the ASCE’s attempts to move engineering into profession 
status was the AIME.  The institute’s obvious purpose was to serve the mining 
industry’s interests, and it showed no interest at all in developing engineering 
into a profession.70  Virtually anyone could obtain full membership.71 
As industrialization resulted in rapid change of American society, 
engineering benefitted greatly.  Industrialization created a bounty of engineering 
jobs, and engineers suddenly grew in numbers, wealth, and influence.  Between 
1850 and 1880, the number of engineers in the United States jumped from about 
2,000 to about 7,000.72  By 1920, that number had multiplied to about 136,000.73 
But the more engineers grew in numbers, the less engineering moved 
toward profession status.  In the closing decades of the 19th Century, engineering 
was badly splintered, and engineers debated vigorously whether their best 
interests lay in independence from business or in casting their lots with it.  
Generally, engineers opted for the middle road.  They rejected AIME’s extreme 
business leanings, but they spurned ASCE’s push for independence as being 
unable to serve the needs of engineering specialists emerging in industry.74 
Engineers favoring the middle road position organized the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in 1880.75  A coalition of engineers, 
inventors, and others established the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
(AIEE).76  More than previous societies, these new organizations better reflected 
the general attitude of the growing number of engineers working in industry.  
Neither organization saw a need for the independence from business advocated 
by ASCE or for maintaining a close union between engineering and business as 
practiced by AIME.77 
Nearly all of ASME’s leaders were owners of industrial firms, which 
blunted any discussion of independence.78  ASME restricted membership to 
individuals who were in “responsible charge” of engineering projects, but it was 
sufficiently loose in enforcing the requirement that more than half of its members 
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were managers or owners of industrial firms.79  An early ASME president 
described society members as “good mechanics by instinct, good men by original 
construction, good fellows by nature and habit and training.”80  Nonetheless, at 
least until the 20th Century, professional engineers rather than business interests 
remarkably controlled ASME’s affairs and policies.81 
The coalition of engineers, inventors and industrialists established the 
AIEE so the United States would have a representative organization at 
Philadelphia’s International Electrical Exposition in 1884.82  AIEE was the 
American counterpart to the British Institute of Electrical Engineers, and its first 
president, Norvin Green, president of Western Union Telegraph Company and a 
physician and politician, was not an engineer.83  Notwithstanding Green’s 
leadership and the large number of non-engineer participants, AIEE remained 
committed to professional engineering ideals.  This commitment resulted 
primarily from the institute’s focus on electrical engineering.  Unlike the other 
engineering specialties, electrical engineering did not evolve from an old artisan 
craft but was involved with application of science and physics.84  To belong to 
AIEE, engineers had to have been involved in some capacity with engineering 
for five years, have been in responsible charge of engineering projects for two 
years, and been able to design engineering systems.85  At first, business interests 
were denied full membership, and this did not create any strife until after the turn 
of the century.86 
Known as the “founder societies,” ASCE, AIME, ASME, and AIEE 
endeavored to operate as federations of all engineering specialties at the end of 
the 19th Century,87 but this was not successful.  Although specialty groups 
enjoyed much self-governance within these societies, they still broke away to 
form their own specialized society groups.  The Naval Society of Architects and 
Marine Engineers began in 1893, followed by the American Society of Heating 
and Ventilating Engineers in 1894, the American Railway Engineering 
Association in 1899, the American Electrochemical Society in 1902, the Society 
of Automotive Engineers in 1904, the Illuminating Engineering Society in 1906, 
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers in 1908, and the Institute of Radio 
Engineers in 1912.88  These groups broke off from the founder societies in 
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disagreement over the proper balance between business and professional 
interests.  These new groups sought a closer alliance with business.89 
 
B.  Vying for Professionalism at the Beginning of the 20th Century 
 
Rapid industrialization after the Civil War quickly transformed American 
society from agrarian to urban.  Industrialization resulted in domination of 
society by manufacturing firms and corporations.90  Advances in science and 
technology gave rise to many new occupations such as plumbers and electricians, 
and individuals working in these new positions began organizing societies to 
promote their mutual interests.91  Several of these societies began pushing for 
occupational licenses in hope that restrictive licenses would create monopolies of 
jobs that would reap economic benefits.92 
Significant changes in society brought on by the nation’s rapid 
industrialization also increased pressure on governments to begin licensing and 
regulating occupations.  Urbanization changed the way consumers interacted 
with providers of goods and services.  Unlike inhabitants of rural areas, city 
dwellers often did not know the persons from whom they bought their goods or 
on whom they depended for important services.93  Not only were these providers 
of goods and services strangers to their customers and clients, but they suddenly 
began using mysterious, newly-invented instruments, such as the 
ophthalmoscope,94 resulting from scientific breakthroughs.  Such instruments 
allowed physicians and scientists to pierce into a realm previously not knowable 
by unaided human senses—or at least make the claim that they could.  
Consumers did not have the understanding, experience, or education to verify 
these claims.95  They had no way of testing their suspicions of being cheated.  
Helpless, they supported regulatory laws proposed by progressive reformers for 
imposing bureaucratic regulation, including licensing, for protecting the public 
                                                                                                                                    
 
89 Id. at 41-42. 
90 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 17. 
91 Id. at 20.  Regular physicians organized the American Medical Association in 1847.  Others 
following suit in organizing effective national organizations, including pharmacists and civil 
engineers in 1852, architects in 1857, dentists in 1859, and veterinarians in 1863.  Id. 
92 Id. at 20-21. 
93 Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the 
Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 729-31 (2005). 
94 Id.  German ophthalmologist Hermann von Helmholtz is credited with developing an instrument 
in 1850, which he described as “a combination of glasses, by means of which it is possible to see 
the dark background of the eye, through the pupil, without employing any dazzling light, and to 
obtain a view of all the elements of the retina at once, more exactly than one can see the external 
parts of the eye without magnification . . . .” J. M. S. Pearce, The Ophthalmoscope: Helmholtz’s 
Augenspiegel, 61 EUROPEAN NEUROLOGY 244, 247 (2009) (citation omitted). 
95 Law & Kim, supra note 93, at 729. 
650 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3 
 
 
 
from incompetent and cheating providers.96  Joining beleaguered consumers in 
seeking the government’s intervention were honest providers who believed that 
licensing was an effective way of purging “bad apples” from their ranks and 
avoid their spoiling everyone’s reputation.97 
Legislators responded to these calls by enacting legislation requiring 
competency examinations as a requisite to obtaining a license to practice any 
number of professions and occupations.  At the close of the 19th Century and in 
the early years of the 20th Century, the states quickly began enacting “[l]aws to 
license doctors, plumbers, barbers, [beauticians,] funeral directors, nurses, 
electricians, horseshoers, dentists, and the practitioners of many other 
occupations. . . .”98  States adopted most of these licensing laws between 1900 
and 1920, a time when progressivism was at its peak of influence.  Marc Law and 
Sukkoo Kim note a jump in medical malpractice lawsuits during this era and 
concluded that it may have resulted from plaintiffs’ using licensing laws, which 
favored the regulars, to establish a standard of acceptable medical practice.99   
Before licensing laws, plaintiffs had difficulty establishing that the practices of 
“quacks” were contrary to acceptable standards. 
During this period, however, consumers did not show signs of being 
concerned by the practices of engineers, probably because they rarely 
encountered engineers—certainly not as routinely as they did doctors, 
veterinarians, barbers, hairdressers, electricians, plumbers, and lawyers.  
Consumers rarely had cause for consulting an engineer, and engineers then, as 
now, had little cause for interacting with the public; they did their work for the 
most part as employees of industrial and manufacturing firms.  So long as the 
business firms took responsibility for their engineering employees’ work, no one 
expressed concern.  Engineering leaders deemed industrial managers to be far 
better judges of their engineering employees’ competence than the public or 
government. 
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Engineers themselves were, for the most part, dismissive of calls for 
licensing by the Progressives.  A few favored licensing, but most agreed with the 
laissez-faire and anti-licensing positions of their industrial allies.  One aspect of 
progressive reforms, however, did significantly affect development of 
engineering.  Progressives were successful in fighting corruption in city 
governments, and much of the corruption involved civil engineering projects, 
such as sewers, streetcar systems, and streetlights.100  As graft involving such 
projects ended, civil engineers were able to attain a new level of 
professionalism.101 
With a flood of new, young graduates of recently formed engineering 
schools joining engineering ranks, the profession made a radical change at the 
beginning of the 20th Century.  For the most part, these new engineers went to 
work for industrial firms, which were riding the crest of industrialization and 
booming.  Bruce Sinclair describes the transformation: 
 
Partnerships and owner-manager firms in the mechanical industries, the 
kind of enterprises that had set the style of professionalism, were 
increasingly being replaced by corporate structures.  Instead of a 
manager engineer intimately familiar with the shop floor, these new 
corporations featured engineering departments separated not only from 
the shop floor but from the firm’s financial administration, too.  And in 
those larger organizations the drive for system and order . . . tended 
increasingly to make engineers, especially junior ones, identical units in 
the corporate machine.102 
 
In the estimation of Ralph Nader, the multitude of junior engineers 
taking jobs at business firms were assuming positions of “minion to corporate 
management.”103 Indeed, industry managers continued to assert control of even 
the engineering societies to which the engineers belonged.  For example, in 1909, 
Morris L. Cooke, a notable mechanical engineer and Philadelphia’s city engineer, 
sought to convene a session at ASME’s annual meeting on the increasing 
problem of urban air pollution.104  Anticipating that his proposal would draw 
opposition, he supported it with a petition signed by many prominent ASME 
members, but, after managers at New York Edison and New York Central 
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Railroad voiced strong opposition to the program, the planning committee turned 
down Cooke’s proposal without explanation.105 
Not only were 20th Century engineers still controlled in many ways by 
outside industrial interests, they were badly splintered into quarreling factions, 
typically at odds over how close engineering should be allied with business.  The 
young societies that broke away from the founder societies at the turn of the 
century did so to forge bonds with business that were so tight the societies often 
functioned more as trade associations than as engineering societies.106  For 
example, the Society of Automotive Engineer deemed one of its missions to be 
helping small, fledgling automotive companies compete with the automotive 
giants by working for adoption of technical standards.107 
Notwithstanding engineering’s close ties with business, engineers 
working in industry maintained strong interest in professionalism.  Engineering 
leaders were confident that engineering had a sound claim for asserting that 
engineering was a bona fide profession.  Their claim rested on three themes.  
They saw engineers as the agents of technological change and, therefore, the vital 
force behind human progress.108  They perceived that, because engineers were 
objective thinkers and problem-solvers, they were best suited for leading societal 
reforms, and the leaders believed that engineers had a duty to make certain that 
technological change was beneficial to society.109  In other words, they 
considered engineering’s relation to science to be a sufficient basis for 
engineering’s claiming profession status.  They asserted that engineering’s close 
tie to business should be ignored because corporations merely were the machines 
or vehicles by which engineers plied their professional skills.110 
Hence, voices of reform, such as that of Morris Cooke, calling for an end 
of engineering’s alliance with business went unheeded.  Engineers at the 
beginning of the 20th Century tenaciously clung to the notion that had defined 
engineering from its earliest days:  its interests were identical to those of the 
firms where engineers worked.111  Only a handful of engineers, virtually all civil 
engineers, saw any merit to joining in the licensing movement that was occurring 
among the other professions. 
Instead of supporting outside regulation such as government licensing 
boards, engineers conceived professionalism to be tied to self-regulation.  ASCE 
preferred self-regulation to government licensing on the rationale that only 
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engineers should pass judgment on the work of engineers.112  ASCE’s 
publication, Engineering News, for example, editorialized in 1908 that regulation 
focused on the engineer as an individual rather than on what truly mattered, the 
engineer’s work.113  The public would be better protected by focusing on the 
latter.114 
Although engineers generally failed to appreciate the benefits to be 
reaped from licensing, the point was not missed by small pockets of engineers 
organizing themselves around local societies.  One of the most profound 
demonstrations of those benefits came at the hands of physicians who were 
practicing traditional medicine—the regulars.  They showed that licensing could 
be an effective means of not only of attaining profession status, but also of 
reengineering a profession to exclude “detractors.” 
 
C.  Medical Profession Shows How to Use Licensing to Reengineer a 
Profession 
 
The transformation that licensing laws caused in the medical profession 
is a graphic illustration of how licensing laws can be used to elevate an 
occupation group into profession status.  The battle in medicine between the 
regulars and practitioners of alternative medicine115 came to a head in West 
Virginia in 1881 when the state’s legislature passed a law restricting lawful 
medical practice to traditional medicine.116  The “regulars” pushed through the 
legislation that effectively shutout practitioners of alternative medicine and 
secured professional standing for the regulars, allowing them to reengineer and 
control medicine as a profession.117 
The West Virginia story culminated in the landmark Supreme Court 
decision in Dent v. West Virginia.118  Although the decision has all but been 
forgotten in administrative law texts,119 it was monumental in establishing a 
state’s broad power to define and regulate a profession in contravention of the 
sacrosanct freedom of contract.120 
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The dispute in Dent arose when, in 1882, West Virginia authorities 
indicted 27-year-old Frank Dent on misdemeanor charges of practicing medicine 
without a license in Newburg, West Virginia.121  The indictment came just 
months after West Virginia became the first state to pass a licensing law that 
restricted the practice of medicine to a defined class.122  Dent was a fourth-
generation physician and had apprenticed for five years under his father, who 
was a degreed graduate of “a well-recognized Regular school.”123 All four 
generations of Dents had practiced traditional medicine in Newburg, and Frank 
Dent had practiced for seven years as a partner with his father and on his own.124 
West Virginia’s new law provided that Dent could obtain a license and 
continue practicing medicine by establishing that he satisfied one of three 
requirements:  (1) that he had a diploma issued by “a reputable medical college”; 
(2) that he had practiced medicine for ten years before 1881; or (3) that he passed 
a two-part written and oral examination administered by the new West Virginia 
Board of Health.125  After learning that the board would not give him credit for 
his five years’ apprenticeship under his father, thus depriving him of a claim of 
ten years of practice before 1881, Dent relocated his practice to Topeka, Kansas, 
where a license was not required.126  He quickly returned home to Newburg, 
however, after deciding that Kansas’ climate did not suit him or his lung ailment 
(likely tuberculosis).127  On his return to Newburg, he stopped in Cincinnati long 
enough to complete a couple of “short courses” at the American Medical Eclectic 
College where, after passing final examinations, he received a medical doctor 
degree.128  Having obtained a diploma, he resumed his medical practice in 
Newburg until a rival physician informed authorities of his unlicensed practice.129 
When board members investigated, Dent presented his recently-issued 
diploma.130  The board rejected the diploma as not having been issued by a 
reputable medical college.131  Deciding the new licensing law deprived him of a 
basic freedom to practice medicine as he saw fit, Dent declined the board’s 
invitation to sit for an examination.132  He opted instead to challenge the law’s 
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constitutionality on the ground that it deprived him of his “vested right” to 
practice medicine.133  In a perfunctory trial presented on stipulated facts, a jury 
returned a guilty verdict after deliberating briefly.134  The court fined Dent $50, 
the minimum allowed.135 
When Dent’s appeals reached the United States Supreme Court in 1889, 
Justice Stephen Field declared for a unanimous court that West Virginia did not 
unduly interfere with Dent’s freedom to choose his occupation or profession.136  
The court acknowledged that choosing an occupation is “a distinguishing feature 
of our republican institutions,”137 but offsetting this right was West Virginia’s 
right to restrict the practice of medicine to individuals whom legislators believed 
had the appropriate education and experience.138  This, the court explained, was 
because the practice of medicine is not just an ordinary occupation, but is one 
that requires “careful preparation,” including mastery of “all those subtle and 
mysterious influences upon which health and life depend . . . .”139  With that 
description, Justice Field secured medicine’s standing as a profession, which, 
unlike ordinary occupations, required the state’s close scrutiny and regulation. 
Nonetheless, Justice Field explained, West Virginia’s exercise of police 
power had to be reasonable to comply with due process.140  West Virginia’s law 
satisfied this requirement if its demands and constraints were not arbitrary or 
capricious, a very low standard.  To satisfy the standard, the law merely had to 
treat every physician alike, and the West Virginia statute did: 
 
It applies to all physicians . . . .  It imposes no conditions which cannot 
be readily met; and it is made enforceable . . . by regular proceedings 
adapted to the case.  It authorizes an examination of the applicant by 
the board of health as to his qualifications when he has no evidence of 
them in the diploma of a reputable medical college in the school of 
medicine to which he belongs, or has not practiced in the state a 
designated period . . . .  If, in the proceedings under the statute, there 
should be any unfair or unjust action on the part of the board in 
refusing him a certificate, we doubt not that a remedy would be found 
in the courts of the state.  But no such imputation can be made, for the 
plaintiff in error did not submit himself to the examination of the board 
after it had decided that the diploma he presented was insufficient.141 
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Dent all but ended the hope of practitioners of alternative medicine for 
recognition.  Not only did it affirm a state’s power to choose among factions in a 
profession, but it also demonstrated that, of all the factors that can transform an 
occupation into a recognized profession, none is more powerful than 
governmental licensing. 
Dent demonstrated that politics is as important a factor as merit in 
achieving passage of licensing legislation.  Although the regulars’ victory in 
West Virginia coincided with notable scientific breakthroughs, politics, rather 
than scientific merit, seems to have been the greater driving force in West 
Virginia’s decision.  The record is void of any time when legislators considered 
the merit of preferring traditional medicine over homeopathy and eclectic 
treatment.142  As James Mohr notes, the regulars “never cited a single scientific 
advance to illustrate why doctors suddenly needed to understand the research 
sciences.  In their defense of scientific education, they never once explained why 
a laboratory knowledge of chemistry would be necessary to administer future 
therapies that might emerge from chemical laboratories.”143  That a maturing 
medical profession in the latter half of the 20th Century would seem to acquit the 
West Virginia legislators’ choice does not make the original decision any less 
politically motivated. 
After Dent, the Supreme Court confirmed in later cases involving 
physician licensing that a state has virtually unfettered policymaking power in 
regulating a profession.  Four years after Dent, Justice David Brewer declared for 
a unanimous Supreme Court, “The power of a state to make reasonable 
provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of 
medicine, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such 
statutory provisions, is not open to question.”144 
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D.  Push for Engineering Licensure 
 
The clear message of the courts’ decisions was that licensing laws were 
an effective means for securing and shaping a profession, and, caught up in the 
Progressives’ push for regulation,145 state legislatures rapidly passed laws 
requiring licenses to practice a number of occupations:  plumbing, barbering, hair 
dressing, funeral directing, electrical work, fitting horses with shoes, and 
eventually flower arranging in Louisiana.146  The overall attitude of engineers, 
however, was opposition to licensure. They preferred to continue policing 
themselves. 
But other regional organizations of engineers saw the opportunity 
presented by licensure.  One of the first such groups to act was a small group of 
civil engineers in Louisiana, which began lobbying in about 1898 for laws to 
restrict the practice of civil engineering to license holders.147  Initially, the 
legislature rebuffed their proposals when other civil engineers opposed them.148  
The proponents of licensing eventually succeeded in 1908,149 but, before they did, 
a notable civil engineer and Wyoming’s state engineer, Clarence Johnston, 
lobbied for150 and obtained in Wyoming in 1907 what has come to be recognized 
as the first engineering licensing law in the United States, although the law was 
very limited in its scope.151 
In his January 1904 report to the Governor, Johnston, a graduate of the 
University of Michigan’s civil engineering program,152 lamented that most 
anyone—even lawyers—could prepare the survey maps that had to be attached to 
applications for state irrigation permits.153  The result, Johnston said, was that the 
maps were of no use to his office or Wyoming landowners.154  This initiated a 
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push for legislation that restricted preparation of survey maps to engineers and 
land surveyors holding a license.  In defending his proposal, Johnston described 
preparation of the survey maps as “one of the most important duties of the 
engineer in Wyoming” because of its effect on the public.155  He further argued 
that federal authorities required mining surveyors to submit to an examination 
and mining surveys are “no more important than the surveys which should be 
made prior to the preparation of maps and applications, for permit to use the 
water of the public.”156 
Wyoming’s legislature responded by enacting in 1907 the nation’s first 
licensing law of any kind pertaining to engineering.157  It said: 
 
All engineers and surveyors who shall hereafter perform any 
field work preliminary to the preparation of an application for permit to 
use the water of the State or who shall make surveys or do engineering 
work relative to the utilization or use of water, shall satisfy a board to 
be known as the Board of Examining Engineers . . . that they belong to 
one or more of [five] classes [of land surveyor (Class One), 
topographic engineer, (Class Two), hydraulic and hydrographic 
engineer (Class Three), construction and designing engineer (Class 
Four), and administrative irrigation engineer (Class Five)].158 
 
The law did not otherwise restrict the practice of engineering in Wyoming.  
Anyone could engage lawfully in any other form of engineering in the state. 
In the meantime, as the Louisiana civil engineers pushed for what would 
truly be the first engineering licensing law, Johnston joined fellow civil 
engineers, members of the American Society of Civil Engineers, in opposing 
them.159  ASCE was strongly committed to self-regulation, and the civil engineers 
opposing the licensing proposal believed the Louisiana law was much too 
broad.160  It sought not only to regulate engineers and engineering through the 
power of the state, but to regulate all civil engineers, even those who did not 
reside in Louisiana.161  Johnston noted that the legislation he had endorsed 
addressed a specific problem created by a particular group, whereas the 
Louisiana engineers sought to regulate engineering without being able to 
articulate any existing problems.162 
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The opponents’ views prevailed for a few years but failed in the end.  
After repeated rebuffs, the Louisiana legislature passed in 1908 the first law in 
the United States that restricted the practice of civil engineering to licensed 
individuals.163  In addition to requiring licensure, Louisiana’s law established a 
state agency and granted it power to set standards for the practice of civil 
engineering in Louisiana.164 
ASCE was more successful in defeating licensing efforts in other states.  
Licensing legislation was proposed in Idaho in 1909, and the next year bills were 
considered in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York.165  In 1911, the Alabama 
legislature considered a proposed engineering licensing law.166  In each state, civil 
engineers, primarily members of ASCE, were able to defeat the measures by 
arguing that only engineers, not the state, should regulate the practice of 
engineering.167 
In 1915, Illinois became the third state to enact an engineering licensing 
law, but the law applied only to persons engaged in structural engineering.168  
Illinois would wait until 1945 to enact an all-encompassing engineering licensing 
law.169 
In 1917, Florida became the first state to enact an engineering licensing 
law that encompassed all engineering specialties.170  The legislation came about 
because of the lobbying efforts of Florida engineers who had organized the 
Florida Engineering Society just the previous year.171  As their first order of 
business, society members began lobbying for a licensing law172 and quickly 
persuaded state legislators that restricting the practice of engineering to licensed 
individuals was the best way to ensure that Florida built a long-lasting 
infrastructure, which was then much in its infancy.173 
Although ASCE leaders were fully committed to professionalism, they 
perceived engineers, not government bureaucrats, best understood what 
constituted good engineering practices.  Proponents of licensing believed that 
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placing engineers on governing boards and putting practicing engineers in charge 
of formulating regulation should allay these concerns.  The boom years before 
the Great Depression helped squelch interest in licensing.  It was never 
completely forgotten, but with so many engineers prospering along with a 
flourishing industry, licensing gained little traction among engineers.174 
Opposition to licensing waned with an end of the good times.  
Challenges to the ideas of the “old guard” by the numerous young engineers 
entering the profession had already chipped away some opposition to licensure,175 
but economic bad times was quite effective in quieting opposition.  With many 
engineers out of work during the Great Depression of the 1930s, licensing 
became appealing, especially to the young engineers.  It had the potential of 
limiting the supply of engineers and protecting jobs and salaries.176  Edwin 
Layton describes the situation: 
 
In the period between 1929 and 1933, the income of engineers declined 
almost twice as much as the average of all salaries.  It was the younger 
men who were hardest hit by unemployment and low salaries.  The 
consultants in civil engineering felt especially threatened in the 1930s, 
because so much of the remaining work in their field was undertaken 
by the federal government.  The private consultant appeared to be 
facing extinction.177 
 
Hence, ASCE’s opposition waned, and support for licensure picked up 
momentum—at least momentarily.  By 1933, legislatures in twenty-seven of the 
then forty-eight states had enacted laws requiring a license to practice at least 
some aspect of engineering working.178  Hawaii, as a territory, enacted a licensing 
law in 1923.179 
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But opposition never went away.  Much of it emanated from a realization 
of leaders of the engineering societies that they would not be able to qualify for 
licensure.  Most of the leaders were executives or managers of industrial firms.  
Because they had not practiced engineering for some time, they feared that they 
would be unable to pass a licensing examination.180  Moreover, many considered 
the “closed profession” associated with licensure to be tantamount to collectivism 
or unionization, and the opposition to both was very strong among engineers.181  
Furthermore, many engineering leaders remained quite committed to industry, 
and industrial leaders mounted much opposition to licensing.  They argued that 
licensing laws would expose their firms to undue governmental intrusion into 
their internal employee affairs.182 
A few engineering leaders, however, understood the importance of 
licensing to engineering’s achieving full profession status.  They recognized that 
achieving profession status was unlikely until every state restricted the practice 
of engineering to individuals meeting minimum standards of knowledge, 
education, and experience.  One of the more notable advocates for licensing was 
David Steinman, a renowned civil engineer and bridge builder.183  In 1934, after 
failing to garner support for his ideas among other engineering leaders, he led in 
establishment of the National Society of Professional Engineers for the purpose 
of uniting the profession in gaining the elusive profession status.184  “Engineers 
are pioneers, pathfinders, trailblazers in almost everything they do—with one 
exception,” he lamented in a 1932 speech.185  “They have left it to the other 
professions to be the pioneers and trailblazers in securing professional 
recognition in the field of organizational and legislative activities for the 
advancement of the status of the profession.”186  Steinman acknowledged that 
engineering licensing laws were “necessary for the safety of the public,” but he 
understood, too, that they were “also necessary for the protection of the good 
name of the profession.”187 
With twenty-two states yet to enact a licensing law and with industry’s 
opposition growing stronger, Steinman persuaded NSPE members to embark on 
an all-out campaign to achieve licensing in the remaining states.  He also wanted 
to seek amendment of narrowly-scoped laws that applied to only one specialty,188 
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and he led NSPE in beginning to push in 1934 for uniform licensing laws among 
the states.189 
Steinman and those joining with him traveled to state capitols to lobby 
legislators.  They gave speeches, wrote letters, published numerous editorials, 
and helped draft legislation.190  Their campaign was successful.  In the 
campaign’s first year alone—in 1935—seven states adopted licensing laws.191  By 
1940, only five states did not have engineering licensing laws,192 and by 1947 all 
forty-eight states had enacted some form of engineering licensing law.193  The 
territory of Alaska enacted a licensing law in 1939, and the United States 
Congress made engineering licensing universal by enacting a law in 1950 that 
applied to the District of Columbia.194 
Tragedy often is an effective catalyst for remedial legislation and can go 
a long way in disarming opposition.  Indeed, in addition to NSPE’s campaign, 
engineering failures played a significant role in motivating legislators to pass 
engineering licensing laws.  Two disastrous events were particularly significant 
in the states’ enactment of licensing laws.195 
One of the disasters was the collapse of the poorly-designed St. Francis 
Dam on the Santa Clara River near Los Angeles in 1928 in which 400 to 600 
persons perished.196  Overseeing every detail of the dam’s construction was 
William Mulholland, Los Angeles’ chief engineer who was self-educated and 
had begun as a ditch digger.197  Mulholland overlooked obvious indications that 
he was placing the dam on an unstable fault line.198  A year later, California 
legislators enacted laws requiring civil engineers to be licensed.199 
The other disaster was a natural gas explosion resulting from a poorly-
designed gas distribution system at a school in New London, Texas, in 1937.200  
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Nearly 300 children and teachers died in the explosion when a spark from a 
power tool in the school’s industrial arts room ignited a pool of natural gas that 
had collected in the school’s crawl space.201 The gas leak occurred after school 
maintenance workers improperly rigged connections of the school’s heating 
system to a nearby oil field natural gas line.202  In response to the public’s 
demand for remedial legislation, Texas legislators enacted an engineering 
licensing law only months after the explosion.203 
Although every jurisdiction had enacted engineering licensing laws by 
1950, the laws did not close the profession as licensing proponents had expected.  
The laws typically applied only to engineers in “responsible charge” of 
engineering, leaving open engineering done under the supervision of an engineer 
in responsible charge.  Thus, the laws were generally irrelevant to the work of the 
overwhelming mass of engineers who worked in industry and were not in 
responsible charge of engineering projects.  Nevertheless, to make certain that 
the engineering being done within the confines of industry did not implicate 
licensing laws, industry mounted its own counter-campaign to gain legislation 
exempting from licensure engineering done by an employee of a manufacturer or 
industrial firm. 
 
III.  INDUSTRIAL EXEMPTION:  INDUSTRY’S COUNTERMAND OF 
ENGINEERING LICENSURE 
 
Beginning in about 1940, leaders of industrial firms and public utilities 
mounted a counterattack against the licensing laws that endured for about twenty 
years.204  Instead of seeking repeal of the licensing legislation, industry sought 
exemption of their employees from licensing requirements.  Industry asserted 
that, so long as it was willing to take responsibility for its engineers’ work and 
was liable for their negligence, licensing was unnecessary for protection of the 
public’s interests.  Moreover, industry lobbyists asked:  who was a better judge 
of an engineer’s competence than the entity that was taking legal responsibility 
for his or her work? 
Industry’s campaign for an industrial exemption was successful for the 
most part.  It attained industrial exemptions in three-fourths of the states—in all 
                                                                                                                                    
 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203McGuirt, supra note 16, at 27. 
204 ROBBINS, supra note 178, at 244; Craig Musselman, The Industrial Exemption: What, If 
Anything, Should the Profession Do? NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nspe.org/resources/blogs/pe-licensing-blog/industrial-exemption-what-if-anything-
should-profession-do. 
664 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3 
 
 
 
but twelve and the District of Columbia.205  Morton Fine, former executive 
director of the National Council of Engineering Examiners, suggested that the 
campaign’s success had less to do with the merits of industry’s arguments than 
with industry’s overwhelming political influence.206  The lesson of Frank Dent’s 
case in West Virginia would lend credence to this notion.207 
 
A.  The Nature of the Industrial Exemption 
 
M. J. Kolhoff was an engineer working in industry who has endeavored 
to articulate a defense of the industrial exemption as necessary for setting the 
jurisdictional scope of licensing laws.208  Such “a delimiter,” as he called it, was 
required by the “all-encompassing” manner in which most states defined 
engineering.209  He saw the industrial exemption as a way of paring back broadly-
worded licensing statutes to avoid including persons and activities that legislators 
did not intend to include.  He argued that the industrial exemption’s jurisdictional 
function is important for protecting engineers from an overreaching government.  
This protection is necessary, he asserted, because of the basic freedoms that are 
at stake:  engineers’ right to choose where and for whom to employ their skills.  
As confirmed by the Supreme Court in Dent,210 this freedom is fundamental.  A 
state should be able to override this freedom only when necessary “to protect 
citizens from possible fraud and other forms of economic or physical harm that 
might stem from services by unscrupulous or unqualified practitioners.  In 
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particular, this protection has been applied where the public is unable to 
adequately evaluate the qualifications of the practitioners that they may 
employ.”211 
Hence, Kolhoff argued, the industrial exemption has a “specific target” 
to exempt “the internal engineering that is ancillary to the design, manufacture, 
sale, service, and repair of products of [a] state’s industries.”212  A policy of 
exempting ancillary engineering is sound, he asserted, because it does not 
threaten the public’s safety and welfare.  The only party affected is the one who 
employs the engineer; hence, licensing applicable to ancillary engineering is 
unnecessary and overreaching.  Elimination of the exemption would expose 
engineers in industry to unwarranted licensing; thus, unduly impinging on the 
fundamental freedom of engineers working in industry. 
In an attempt to establish that the engineering covered by the exemption 
does not threaten the public, Kolhoff asked two pointed questions.  First, “[a]re    
. . . engineers in industry . . . posing a serious threat of injury to life, health, and 
property of the state’s citizens—a threat for which there is inadequate legal 
protection?”213  Second, “[w]ould [elimination of the industrial exemption] 
appreciably reduce any residual product-related threat to life, health, or property 
of the citizens of the state wherein the engineering is regulated?”214  His answer 
to both was that he did not find “convincing evidence” of either proposition.215 
Consistent with Kolhoff’s point, some state licensing laws do phrase the 
exemption in terms suggesting that its target is internal ancillary engineering that 
any industrial firm must do to get a product to market.  Connecticut’s statute, for 
example, exempts an employee of a “manufacturing or scientific research and 
development corporation . . . provided the engineering work performed by such   
. . . employees shall be incidental to the research and development or 
manufacturing activities of such corporation . . . .”216  Missouri’s statute exempts 
“[a]ny person engaged in engineering who is a full-time, regular employee of a 
person engaged in manufacturing operations and which engineering so performed 
by such person relates to the manufacture, sale or installation of the products of 
such person . . . .”217  Engineering that is “incidental” to, or “relates” to, the 
manufacture of a product arguably is ancillary engineering, as Kolhoff asserted. 
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Such statutes, however, make up only a portion of those states granting 
an industrial exemption.  Each state independently formulates its engineering 
licensing laws; thus, the laws vary significantly from state to state as each takes 
its own nuanced approach.  The result is a hodgepodge of inconsistent laws.218  A 
number of states do not have an industrial exemption at all,219 and a number of 
others have exemptions so broad that they allow the unlicensed practice of any 
kind of engineering—whether it is ancillary or primary—so long as it is done in 
an industry context.220 
Furthermore, even if the statutory language were uniform from state to 
state, it would be subject to the interpretations of each state’s licensing 
authorities and to the inconsistencies of enforcement.  Each state has virtually 
unfettered control of how to prosecute its laws.  What constitutes incidental 
engineering is in the eyes of the enforcer.  With statutes full of ambiguities and 
vague language requiring interpretation and as personalities and local cultures 
affect attitudes, enforcement varies widely from state to state, as acknowledged 
by a task force constituted by the National Council of Examiners of Engineering 
and Surveying:  “Jurisdictions are not necessarily enforcing licensure in 
categories that are not exempt . . . .”221  Missouri’s licensing board candidly 
acknowledged that, although it believed Missouri statutes required professors of 
graduate level engineering courses to be licensed, it only “encouraged 
compliance but does not enforce.”222  As agencies of the administrative state, 
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licensing boards typically have much discretion to allow full measure of the 
board’s expertise.223 
Contrary to Kolhoff’s view, unlicensed engineers daily engage in 
primary and ancillary engineering in this country.  They do so either because 
they work in a state whose exemption is so broadly worded that it applies the 
exemption to primary engineering work, or because the board in the state 
declines to expend limited enforcement resources pursuing actions based on the 
often fine-haired distinctions between primary and ancillary engineering.  
Consider, for example, the exemption in force in Colorado, which exempts 
“[p]artnerships, professional associations, joint stock companies, limited liability 
companies, or corporations, or the employees of any such organizations, who 
perform engineering services for themselves or their affiliates . . . .”224  This 
statute does not exempt only ancillary engineering.  It does not restrain the nature 
of engineering practiced at all, other than to require that the engineering be done 
for the partnership, professional association, joint stock company, limited 
liability company, or corporation.  It does not even require the organization that 
employs the person be an industrial firm or manufacturer.  The door to 
unlicensed practice of engineering could not be open much wider.225  Surely, such 
a situation poses significant threats to the public.  For example, the engineering 
of the faulty switches besetting General Motors in recent days were engineered 
for GM by Delphi Mechatronics before GM engineers brought the matter in-
house and assumed responsibility for the switches.226  Whether the work was 
ancillary or primary to GM’s manufacturing of automobiles is open to 
interpretation.  Either way, the work reportedly has resulted in the deaths of at 
least twelve persons in automobile crashes.227  Even if designing the switches 
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were deemed primary engineering, unlicensed persons could do the work 
lawfully under Michigan’s exemption.228 
Kolhoff, however, added a qualifier to his contention.  He asserted that 
the work of engineers working in industry did not pose “a threat for which there 
is inadequate legal protection[.]”229  The protections he mentioned were “product 
safety legislation” and “legal precedents of the manufacturer’s responsibility for 
the quality and safety . . . .”230 
Kolhoff failed to note that these “protections” all kick in after a product 
has killed or maimed.  Tort liability can make a tortfeasor pay a widow for her 
husband’s wrongful death, but surely most widows would opt for protection that 
attempts to avoid their husbands’ being killed by a product in the first place.  
Product safety legislation can require industry to take remedial action to correct 
its dangerous wares, but they typically apply after a product has already done its 
killing or maiming.  Such laws are not nearly as effective in preventing mishaps 
as a reasonably prudent engineer would be in designing safety into a product at 
the outset. 
Moreover, Kolhoff’s reliance on product safety legislation was 
misplaced.  His argument was published in 1983.  Since then, with the 
protections of the laws noted by Kolhoff in place, the mayhem caused by 
consumer products has worsened.  During 2010, more than 38.5 million 
Americans sought medical attention for injuries related to consumer products, up 
from the more than 28 million who received medical treatment for such injuries 
in 1985.231  Consumer advocate Ralph Nader predicted that threats posed by “the 
products and processes of technology”232 would significantly tarnish engineers’ 
reputations “as the realization spreads of what the engineer can do in contrast to 
what he does do to diminish the hazards to life and limb . . . .”233 
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Although unlicensed engineers working in industry undoubtedly strive to 
apply the same engineering principles as licensed engineers do, Nader suggested 
that the industrial context creates a major handicap for those engineers working 
under an exemption.  It deprives them of independence.  He noted that they are 
often co-opted by “corporate culture.”234  Engineers working in this context, he 
said, struggle to “live professional lives of their own in technical societies and 
public forums apart from their employee status and without fear of overt or 
covert retaliation whether in the form of dismissal, demotion, or the freezing of 
promotion.”235 
 
B.  Real Life for Engineers Working in Industry: The Challenger Saga 
 
Supporting Nader’s point is the remarkable story of the losing battle 
Morton-Thiokol engineers waged in an attempt to avert the space shuttle 
Challenger tragedy in 1986.  Six astronauts and a school teacher perished in the 
disaster, and it nearly killed America’s space program. 
Thiokol’s rocket motor engineers put their jobs on the line in trying to 
stand up against NASA and Thiokol’s management.  On the eve of the 
Challenger’s launch, Thiokol’s vice president of engineering Bob Lund, acting 
on the data and conclusions prepared by the company’s engineers, recommended 
that the Challenger’s launch be delayed because of the frigid temperatures 
forecasted and the debilitating effect the extreme cold would have on the solid 
rocket motor seals.236 
Two of the engineers, Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson, had sounded 
an alarm when they learned that forecasts called for overnight temperatures as 
low as eighteen degrees Fahrenheit at Cape Canaveral, and launch-time 
temperatures were expected to be below thirty degrees.237  The lowest 
temperature in which NASA had launched a shuttle was fifty-three degrees, and 
Thiokol engineers had discovered evidence that during that flight the O-rings 
sealing the rocket motors had allowed hot gases to escape the motors’ casings.238  
Previous testing had confirmed that low temperatures negatively affected the O-
rings’ function.  Boisjoly had written memos the previous year warning that O-
ring failure could allow gas flumes to escape and set off an explosion in the 
shuttle’s external tank.239 
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A week before the Thiokol engineers’ recommendation, NASA had 
stunned Thiokol management with an announcement that it was proceeding with 
serious consideration of transferring the job of disassembling the shuttle’s solid 
rocket boosters after each flight to one of Thiokol’s competitors.240  Thiokol 
management became quite apprehensive that such a move might be followed by 
Thiokol’s losing its contract to assemble the booster segments before each flight 
in the vehicle assembly building at Cape Canaveral.241  And to add to Thiokol’s 
pressures, NASA had been making noise that, because of future plans to increase 
shuttle launches to two a month, it was considering terminating its contract with 
Thiokol as the sole source for the shuttle’s rocket motors.242  Alan McDonald, 
Thiokol’s senior management liaison for solid rocket boosters, described the 
pressure on Thiokol managers:  “It was not the perfect situation for levelheaded 
engineering thinking to trump vital business concerns inside Morton Thiokol 
management, not with billions of dollars at stake.”243  He added that, had 
“Thiokol management not feared that [solid rocket booster] activities might be 
second-sourced to our competitors, a key domino leading to the Challenger 
disaster of January 28, 1986, might never have fallen.”244 
The domino fell the night before the Challenger’s launch.  During a 
three-way teleconference among Thiokol engineers in Brigham City, Utah, with 
NASA shuttle flight engineers and managers at Kennedy Space Center in Cape 
Canaveral, Florida, and Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, 
Thiokol engineers stunned NASA officials with its recommendation not to 
launch the Challenger the next morning.245  This was not welcomed news for 
NASA, which earlier that day had scrubbed the Challenger’s scheduled launch 
for the sixth time in more than a month.246 
Earlier on the afternoon of January 27, 1986, Thiokol engineers in Utah 
began working with Bob Lund, Thiokol’s vice president in charge of 
engineering, after getting confirmation of weather conditions at Cape 
Canaveral.247  The Thiokol engineers participated in a preliminary teleconference 
with NASA managers during the early evening. They expressed their concerns 
and declared that they believed that the launch should be delayed.248  When 
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Thiokol’s engineers teleconferenced later that night with a full contingency of 
NASA managers and engineers, Lund unequivocally recommended against 
launching if the temperature was below fifty-three degrees Fahrenheit.249  
Thiokol’s engineers unanimously supported the recommendation, and no one at 
Thiokol made any comment favoring launch.250 
NASA’s reaction surprised Thiokol.  Lawrence Mulloy, head of NASA’s 
rocket booster program at Marshall, declared that he could not accept the 
rationale for the recommendation—that he needed more quantitative data—and 
George Hardy, deputy director of science and engineering at Marshall, said he 
was “appalled” by it.251  Mulloy asked pointedly, “Thiokol, when do you want me 
to launch, next April?”252  After NASA’s Stanley Reinartz253 expressed confusion 
concerning specifications that seemed to suggest that the O-rings were qualified 
to function as low as forty degrees Fahrenheit, Mulloy criticized Thiokol’s data 
as “inconclusive.”254 
Thiokol engineers understood NASA to be asking them to prove 
quantitatively that the O-rings were likely to fail.255  They did not believe that 
they could do that.  Joe Kilminster, Thiokol’s vice president of space booster 
programs, then tipped the domino that would seal the fate of the Challenger 
crew.  He asked for five minutes for Thiokol engineers to caucus for purposes of 
re-evaluating the data.256 
The account of the remarkable half-hour standoff between engineering 
and management occurring after Kilminster hit the mute button in Brigham City 
validates Nader’s warning to engineers working in industry: that they should 
expect times when management, for business reasons, will be dismissive of their 
sound engineering judgment.257  Such incidents seem inevitable. 
In the room were about ten Thiokol engineers and management 
executives, Jerry Mason, senior vice president of Thiokol’s Wasatch Operations, 
and Cal Wiggins, vice president and general manager of Thiokol’s space 
division.258  The story of the intense debate is best told by an engineer who was 
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there and who lived the agony of having management refuse to listen to his 
warnings of dire consequences.  In his testimony before the President’s 
Commission investigating the Challenger disaster, Roger Boisjoly recalled: 
 
[T]he caucus started by Mr. Mason stating a management decision was 
necessary.  Those of us who opposed the launch continued to speak out, 
and I am specifically speaking of Mr. Thompson and myself because in 
my recollection he and I were the only ones that vigorously continued 
to oppose the launch.  And we were attempting to go back and rereview 
and try to make clear what we were trying to get across, and we 
couldn’t understand why it was going to be reversed.  So we spoke out 
and tried to explain once again the effects of low temperature.  Arnie 
actually got up from his position which was down the table, and walked 
up the table and put a quarter pad down in front of the table, in front of 
the management folks, and tried to sketch out once again what his 
concern was with the joint [sealed by the O-rings], and when he 
realized he wasn’t getting through, he just stopped. 
I tried one more time with the photos.  I grabbed the photos, 
and I went up and discussed the photos once again and tried to make 
the point that it was my opinion from actual observations that 
temperature was indeed a discriminator and we should not ignore the 
physical evidence that we had observed. 
And again, I brought up the point that [an earlier shuttle flight 
in January 1985] had a 110 degree arc of black grease while [a flight in 
October 1985] had a relatively different amount, which was less and 
wasn’t quite as black.  I also stopped when it was apparent that I 
couldn’t get anybody to listen.259 
 
Boisjoly then responded to a question from the commission as to whether 
any Thiokol engineers spoke up in favor of launching: 
No, sir.  No one said anything, in my recollection, nobody said 
a word.  It was then being discussed amongst the management folks.  
After Arnie and I had our last say, Mr. Mason said we have to make a 
management decision . . . .  From this point on, management 
formulated the points to base their decision on.  There was never one 
comment in favor, as I have said, of launching by any engineer or other 
nonmanagement person in the room before or after the caucus.  I was 
not even asked to participate in giving any input to the final decision 
charts [being prepared to support a recommendation to launch]. 
I went back on the [teleconference network] with the final 
charts or final chart, which was the rationale for launching, and that 
was presented by Mr. Kilminster.  It was hand written on a notepad . . . 
.  I did not agree with some of the statements that were being made to 
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support the decision.  I was never asked nor polled, and it was clearly a 
management decision from that point.260 
 
Boisjoly also told the commissioners that what occurred that night was not the 
first time he had endured such a confrontation with management.  He said that he 
experienced it before while working for other companies.261 
After Thompson and Boisjoly finished making their arguments, Mason 
polled the room, “Am I the only one who wants to fly?”262  The engineers did not 
respond.263  Wiggins and Kilminster indicated that they were ready to reverse 
Thiokol’s recommendation.264  He then turned to Lund, the company’s vice 
president of engineering, who had not responded.265  Lund’s support would be 
important to NASA because he had made the original recommendation on the 
basis of engineering.  Mason pressed him:  “‘We’re just going over and over the 
same information, . . . and it’s time for a decision.’  When Lund still [did not 
respond], Mason said, ‘It’s time for you, Bob, to take off your engineering hat 
and put on your management hat.’”266  With that, Lund relented.267 
When the teleconference resumed, Kilminster announced that Thiokol, 
after reconsidering the data, was recommending that the launch proceed.268  
NASA asked Kilminster to put his recommendation in writing.269  He agreed to 
do so.270  The next morning, on January 28, at 11:38, while the temperature was 
thirty-six degrees Fahrenheit, NASA launched.271  The Challenger rose to about 
50,000 feet and exploded a mere seventy-three seconds into its flight.272 
Experts later determined that, just as Boisjoly had warned,273 superhot 
gasses had blown by an O-ring stiffed by frigid temperatures.274  Escaping from a 
rocket motor, a plume of hot gases ignited an explosion in the Challenger’s large 
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external tank tied to the orbiter’s belly.275  The tank was filled with 1.6 million 
pounds of liquid hydrogen and oxygen.276 
Roger Boisjoly did all anyone could reasonably expect him to do to 
prevent the disaster.  Although he was not licensed at the time,277 he did 
everything that the public would expect of a professional engineer.  He put the 
public’s interests ahead of his own.  He did what men facing such situations 
rarely do: He laid his job and self-interest on the line and stood up for the seven 
individuals whose space craft would be propelled by his company’s rocket 
motors the next day. 
 
C.  What Difference Would a License Have Made? 
 
During such times as Roger Boisjoly faced, about the most significant 
effect a professional license can have is to serve as an outside influence—a 
reminder to the professional that his or her duties extend far beyond his or her 
employer’s interests to include the public’s interest.278  It serves as a sort of 
brooding omnipresence279 to prick the professional’s conscience during such 
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ethical dilemmas such as Boisjoly and the other Thiokol engineers faced.  It is 
what Martin Goland had in mind when he admonished that, for an engineer to 
“use his professional talents in a cause he believes to be unworthy is a violation 
of a sacred social trust.”280   
A license surely would not have made Boisjoly more zealous and 
passionate that night in Brigham City.  Even without a license, he seemed to be 
spurred by an brooding omnipresence from another source.  Indeed, in an account 
of his life, a British newspaper told of an encounter he had experienced about a 
dozen years before the Challenger ordeal: 
 
In 1974 [Boisjoly] was working with the Rockwell Corporation on 
stress analysis for the Shuttle crew compartment when he noticed that a 
fellow worker was increasingly distressed.  It turned out that the 
colleague had previously worked on the design of the DC-10 cargo 
door, and had argued for changes to improve it.  The man had not 
insisted, however, and in March 1974 a DC-10 cargo hatch failed near 
Paris, resulting in the deaths of 346 people.281 
 
The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized in Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,282 
that professional licenses certainly can have the effect of a brooding 
omnipresence.  Like the Challenger incident, the Balla case involved a 
showdown between a professional, an attorney named Roger Balla, and 
management, Gambro’s president.283  Balla had learned that Gambro was 
planning to sell equipment in violation of federal regulations.284  Balla told 
Gambro’s president that he would do all he could to block the sale.285  The 
company fired him a month later, and he sued the company for retaliatory 
discharge.286 
But the Balla court refused to extend the tort’s protection to Balla.287  The 
court reasoned that the tort’s purpose was to provide a remedy for an employee 
who been wronged after standing up to protect the public, such as a 
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whistleblower might do.288  Although that certainly described Balla, the court 
concluded that Balla, as a lawyer, already had a duty to protect the public by 
reporting his employer’s illegal acts.289  Even if it meant losing his job, Balla’s 
law license and the rules of professional conduct it imposed on him obligated 
him to be a whistleblower.290  Because of his duty as a lawyer, the court reasoned, 
“the public policy . . . of protecting the lives and property of citizens, is 
adequately safeguarded without extending the tort . . . .”291  
Regardless of the correctness of the Balla court’s legal reasoning, the 
court made an important point about what it means to be a professional.  As a 
professional, Balla had a duty to exert control over matters of law at Gambro.  In 
his dispute with management over selling the illegal equipment, Balla, as the 
lawyer, could not defer the decision to management.  He could not take off his 
lawyer hat to put on a management hat.  A nonprofessional employee at 
Gambro—say a secretary or clerk—had no such obligation; thus, such an 
employee needed the tort’s special protection should he or she decide to “blow 
the whistle” on Gambro. 
The Balla court was speaking of independent judgment and control. 
Indeed, these are essential indicia of professionalism.292  The distinctive mark of a 
professional is the practitioner’s exercise of independent judgment and exertion 
of control over the subject matter within the professional’s expertise.  
Independent judgment and control require discretion, and a professional can 
expect management to resist such discretion.  Management tends to loath 
discretion by a firm’s employees.  For a business, employee discretion breeds 
inefficiency, which is an enemy of profit.293 
The medical profession illustrates the point.  To effectuate cost savings, 
physicians are being pushed into large business entities, such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMO).  To remain a member of the HMO, a 
physician must conform to the HMO’s constraints.  The less discretion a 
physician exercises, the more “efficient” and profitable his or her services 
become for the HMO.  With such loss of control ever increasing in medicine, the 
medical profession, once featuring autonomous decision-making, appears to be in 
a state of decline.  Indeed, in a review of Elliott Krause’s work on professions,294 
The Economist chronicled the decline in medicine’s status as a profession: 
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American doctors[’] . . . power in the 1940s and 1950s was 
almost total.  Membership of the American Medical Association rose to 
nearly 75% of all doctors in the 1960s.  Through its state associations, 
the AMA controlled entry into the profession and dominated cognate 
professions like nursing, X-ray technology and occupational therapy.  
The AMA ensured that the proportion of doctors in the population 
remained almost static between the early 1930s and the early 1960s.  
Most doctors remained in their own office practices or operated in 
hospitals that they controlled.  All efforts to introduce national health 
insurance—which posed a threat to doctors’ fees as well as their 
autonomy—were successfully resisted. 
Those were the days, now long gone.  By 1990 less than half 
of America’s doctors belonged to the AMA.  The profession as a whole 
is increasingly fragmented among specialised associations and between 
practitioners and academics.  Restrictions on entry into the profession 
collapsed, and the proportion of doctors in the population nearly 
doubled from 151 per 100,000 in 1970 to nearly 300 by 1990.  More 
than half of all American doctors, far from being free-standing 
professionals, are now salaried employees.  Doctors can no longer 
control the previously subordinate medical professions.  They can no 
longer control even their own places of work, with more and more 
decisions—even quasi-medical decisions—being taken by management 
boards and professional administrators.  Worst of all, the AMA a 
generation ago proved unable to resist the introduction of schemes like 
Medicare and Medicaid.295 
 
Medicine’s move away from autonomy—loss of control—and towards the 
subservience of salaried positions is a clear indicator of a decline in the 
profession. 
In this same vein, engineering’s industrial exemption belies 
professionalism.  Its distinctive feature is subservience, not control.  Because an 
engineer is employed by an entity on whom liability will rest, the demands of 
professionalism such as Roger Balla assumed in his job at Gambro296 are lifted 
from his or her shoulders.  Moreover, as Edwin Layton observed, engineers’ 
challenge when working in corporate America is to achieve any amount of moral 
autonomy and social responsibility because “[e]mployers have been unwilling to 
grant autonomy to their employees, even in principle.  They have assumed that 
the engineer, like any other employee, should take orders.”297 
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The industrial exemption is a natural outgrowth of a profession, which, 
from the outset, has been closely allied with the industrial firms it serves.  Since 
the beginning, engineering’s primary role has been to answer industry’s call for 
expertise.  Industry is, and always has been, engineering’s closest associate and 
ally.  Engineers have always depended on industry and its capital298 as much as 
industry has depended on engineers’ know-how.299 
This symbiotic partnership has forged a strong alliance in which, as often 
as not, industry dominates and even controls engineering.  Elliott Krause has 
bluntly concluded that “there never has been much question about the status of 
American engineering: engineers were and are the middle-level employees of 
capitalism.”300 
That night in Brigham City, Jerry Mason understood the nature of 
engineering’s relation to corporate management when he told Thiokol’s head 
engineer that it was time for him “to take off [his] engineering hat.”301  Mason 
knew that management was in charge, not engineering.  He knew that he, as the 
head manager in the room, could insist that his engineers yield their independent 
engineering judgments and join in making a business decision about an 
engineering problem. 
 
IV.  WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE INDUSTRIAL EXEMPTION? 
 
At the beginning of the 21st Century, engineering stands far from 
achieving recognition as a true profession.  Informed engineers admit it.  As 
Stephen J. Ressler acknowledges, “[e]ngineering is regarded as an inherently 
weak profession because of the corporate setting in which engineering work is 
typically performed.”302  And informed engineers have understood their 
profession’s plight for a long time.  In 1910, George Swain, professor of civil 
engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, acknowledged that “many 
well informed people deny that engineering is a profession at all . . . .”303  Elliott 
Krause’s assessment is more candid: 
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[E]ngineering in the United States is a very poorly organized, middle-
level employee group, with a series of scientific societies for each 
specialty, usually run by capitalist engineers-turned-managers.  
Production and development are controlled by the corporations, with a 
high proportion of engineers sharing the corporate values, the loose 
supervision of middle-level employees, and the possibility of 
promotion at least into technical group management.  With practically 
no action as a group across work settings, engineers are an example of 
a group that has never had [the power of a profession].304 
 
A.  The Industrial Exemption is Dangerous to Engineering 
 
The obvious reason states are willing to excuse engineers working in 
industry from licensure does not appear to be, as Kolhoff believed,305 that these 
engineers do only ancillary engineering and thus do not pose much of a threat to 
the public.  The real reason for the industrial exemption is far more likely that the 
states have perceived that engineers working in industry are not in charge.  The 
law has always preferred to pin responsibility on the person in charge.306 
The industrial exemption’s perversion is that, in lifting responsibility 
from the engineer’s shoulders and putting it on management, it necessarily gives 
management claim of control over the engineering work.  The untenable result is 
that a person who may or may not understand engineering has control over 
engineering work—what the work is to be and who is to perform it.  Under the 
exemption, management is free to assign engineering work to any of its 
employees (even those not trained in engineering), and it is free to accord the title 
engineer to any employee without consideration of the employee’s credentials.307  
An engineer having earned a graduate degree may occupy a cubicle next to a 
person who, although titled “engineer,” has not attained even a bachelor’s 
degree.308 
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Engineers working for business firms typically make their decisions as 
members of a team whose specialized contributions are but one of several 
disciplines involved in the project.  As Martin Goland observed, “Team efforts 
necessarily tend to subjugate the individual personality to the group median.”309  
Licensed engineers bear personal responsibility for their work.  Licensure ties 
work product to the licensee.  Unlicensed engineers working in industry under 
the exemption do not bear such responsibility.  Clearly, the public should expect 
work for which an employee must assume personal responsibility to be done with 
greater care than work done by one who knows that his or her employer will be 
assuming responsibility for their work.310  Business managers can be expected to 
make decisions based as much on cost, efficiency, and what customers want as 
on what constitutes good engineering, even if ignoring sound engineering means 
taking risks at the expense of the public’s best interests.  Indeed, engineers have 
“trade[d their] lower-level control of the daily work place for capitalist control of 
ends, projects of work chosen, and even the decisions to hire and fire,” Krause 
observes.311  “Engineering is not in control of the market for services, except for a 
tiny group in consultant status . . . .”312 
This picture simply does not depict a profession.  It portrays instead 
would-be professionals trapped in the world of business often unable to function 
adequately as either a professional or business person.  Way back in 1910, 
George Swain captured the engineer’s plight:  “Many people seem to think that 
the engineer is neither a scientist nor a professional man, nor yet a business man 
strictly speaking, but that he is something betwixt and between—some one to be 
employed for certain technical work.”313 
An engineer is more than a person employed for technical work.  
Today’s engineers, by virtue of their education and esoteric knowledge, should 
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be taking their seat among the venerable professionals.  Stopping them is 
engineering’s long-standing partnership with industry.  Undoubtedly the close 
association between engineering and business is a fact of life that will not 
change; both need each other. 
But if engineering is ever to achieve profession status, it must find a way 
to coexist with business without giving up its control of engineering work.  
Change, if it is going to happen, will be initiated by engineers, not by industry.  
Management has no incentive to change; it has firm control.  Hence, the starting 
point must be for engineers to find a way to wrest control of engineering from 
management. 
That will require a wholly different engineering culture—a complete 
paradigm change—and complete paradigm changes are not easily accomplished.  
They often require nothing short of revolution.  In The Revolt of the Engineer,314 
Edwin Layton sets out the long, complex battle that conservatives and reformers 
have been waging since the turn of the 20th Century.315  Engineers seem to be at a 
crucial point in a more than a hundred-year-long revolution to pull engineering 
into the realm of professionalism. 
 
B.  The Industrial Exemption is Dangerous to the Public 
 
Of course, no revolution can overcome complacency, and engineers 
seem to have become quite complacent about their profession’s status.  One of 
the more alarming of Elliott Krause’s observations about engineers is the effect 
that their working in the corporation context has had on their engineering 
values.316  As should be expected, engineers working in industry must acculturate 
to a large extent into the business world if they have hope for success.  This, of 
course, requires meshing engineering principles with a company’s overarching 
goal of making a profit.  The result, Krause says, is that engineers unavoidably 
take on business values.317 
Studies indicate that the vast majority of engineers perceive cost and 
profit to be as important a factor in their engineering as the physical properties of 
the components with which they work.318  But even beyond that, engineers have 
allowed business values to dissuade them from being whistleblowers.  “One thing 
that engineers almost never do, given their values,” Krause says, “is to complain 
when they work on projects that maximize profits through cutting back on 
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safety.”319  Engineers understand that their questioning safety aspects of a job can 
put them in the express lane to unemployment.320 
As an example of a bad business decision masquerading as an 
engineering failure, the Challenger was not an aberrant occurrence.  A list of 
engineering catastrophes resulting from bad business decisions—often motivated 
by “corner cutting” after a project falls behind schedule and goes over budget—
would be quite lengthy.  One of the more recent ones was the 2010 explosion on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig forty miles off the coast of Louisiana in which 
11 workers were killed and millions of gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf of 
Mexico.321  A presidential commission investigating the disaster concluded that it 
resulted from a series of blunders motivated by saving time and money.322  Every 
year, hundreds of lawsuits are filed in which plaintiffs establish that 
manufacturers consciously chose, for reasons of cost savings and market 
considerations, to sell unsafe consumer products when they knew that safe 
alternatives having little or no cost were available.323  One of the most notable 
examples is Ford’s decision to take its Pinto model to market knowing that the 
car’s design made it susceptible to explosions in the car’s gasoline tank during 
rear-end collisions and that the problem could have been fixed for only $11 a 
car.324 
Putting employer’s interests ahead of the public’s is inconsistent with 
professionalism, especially when doing so has the potential to kill or maim.  
Simply, engineers who do not have the wherewithal to withstand management 
pressure to set aside sound engineering in favor of saving time and money are not 
professionals. 
Hence, before changes necessary for advancing engineering can occur, a 
change of attitude—undoubtedly nothing short of a revolution—must occur 
among engineers.  They must become aware of, and overthrow, the barriers that 
have debilitated sound engineering.  Severely handicapping engineers from 
effectuating the needed change of attitude is a lack of unity and cohesiveness. 
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Louis Gattschalk has noted that provocation does not create revolutions.  
What gives rise to revolutions is solidarity in response to provocation: 
 
The fact that I am discontent will not lead me to revolution unless I am 
aware that quite a number of other people are equally discontented and 
are likely to unite with me in the expression of my discontent.  General 
awareness of resentment against . . . provocations, together with the 
provocations themselves, creates that kind of demand for change which 
becomes effective in making revolutions.”325 
 
Krause agrees, noting that engineers’ complacency has prevented 
development of “oppositional group consciousness.”326  Most engineers do not 
belong to an engineering society, and, if they do, they do not participate in it 
much beyond attending a few social events.327  Without unity, the needed 
revolution is not likely to endure. 
 
C.  Getting Rid of the Dangerous Industrial Exemption 
 
Seemingly, one of the biggest barriers to engineering’s achieving 
recognition as a bona fide profession is the industrial exemption.  It necessarily 
has meant that management, not engineers, is in control of much of the 
engineering that occurs in the United States.  It has significantly affected the 
attitudes of engineers working in industry by allowing them to avoid 
responsibility for their engineering and by requiring them to factor business 
principles into their engineering judgment.  The stark reality seems to be that, if 
engineering is ever going to achieve recognition as a bona fide profession, 
undoubtedly the catalyst will be a significant paring back, if not elimination, of 
the industrial exemption. 
The bad news, however, is that even if every state with some form of 
industrial exemption were to amend their statutes to restrict the exemption’s 
application to ancillary engineering, as Kolhoff advocated,328 it would not be 
enough.  Although Kolhoff is correct that the public should be adequately 
protected if the work being done under the exemption is work that affects only 
the firm for whom the engineer works, asking licensing boards to make and 
enforce such fine-haired distinctions probably is asking for too much.  Hence, 
nothing short of outright elimination of the exemption will be enough. 
Eliminating the exemption will not be easy.  Industrial management has 
good reason to want to retain the status quo; it is in control.  For example, when 
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attempts were made in Texas during 2003 to eliminate the exemption, industry 
was effective in blocking the efforts.329  According to a NCEES task force, “The 
industry lobbies, arguing economic development via contracted cheaper foreign 
engineering services, were able to stop any action . . . .”330  Industry was able to 
kill an effort in 1993 to pare back the exemption in Louisiana, even after much 
effort was made to accommodate industrial interests.331 
Engineers working in industry have little personal incentive for change.  
They avoid the hassles of difficult examinations and times of apprenticeship 
typically associated with licensing, and they enjoy the “safe harbor” of engaging 
in an interesting job within an organization that assumes responsibility for their 
work.  Vestiges of engineers’ ambivalence toward licensing and siding with 
industry remain.  For example, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
defends the exemption as a necessity for chemical businesses that typically 
conduct interstate and international transactions.  “Because of the lack of 
uniformity in licensing laws and regulations between jurisdictions,” the 
institute’s policy statement said, “the need for multiple licensures creates an 
unnecessary burden on the engineer and company while providing no additional 
benefit to the general health and welfare of the public.”332  The Public Affairs and 
Outreach Sector of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers announced 
similar views.333 
Between such opposition by industry and engineers sympathetic to 
industry, there does not appear to be much hope for eliminating the exemption.  
There has been a bit of action, such as legislation introduced during the 2013-14 
legislative session to the Pennsylvania General Assembly to eliminate the 
exemption in Pennsylvania.334  Such legislation rarely gains traction, however, 
and the Pennsylvania bill did not.  Montana is the only state to throw out the 
exemption, and that was more than thirty years ago.335 
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Understanding that eliminating the exemption will require a revolution, 
opponents of the exemption have called for a multi-faceted campaign.  A task 
force of the National Council of Examiners of Engineering and Surveying has 
recommended beginning the campaign in the nation’s engineering classrooms.  
The group calls for convincing engineering faculty to place more emphasis on 
licensure, especially in engineering ethics courses, in hope of making licensure 
seem like the natural next step for graduates of engineering school.336  The task 
force also recommends working for modifications of reciprocity laws to facilitate 
interstate practices and to heed the concerns expressed by the American Institute 
of Chemical Engineers and others.337  The task force understands, too, that it must 
find a way to “grandfather” the hundreds of thousands of unlicensed engineers 
working in industry.338  Finally, the task force recommends an all-out public 
relations campaign: 
 
The public will need to understand why the elimination should be 
undertaken, industry will need to understand why this change would be 
advantageous to its long-term benefit, the profession will have to agree 
to some form of initial compromise on some of the legs of licensure, 
and the licensing boards will have to address comity.339 
 
The last recommendation seems to be the most important one.  So long 
as the public fails to perceive the danger posed by the industrial exemption—its 
facilitation of badly engineered industrial and manufactured products—
legislative complacency will surely continue.  The public must be made aware 
that engineering licensing laws rarely apply to the engineering work being done 
in their states and that the overwhelming majority of engineering is being done 
by unlicensed engineers.  Legislators will be far more responsive to the outcries 
of a public demanding explanation for why, if the legislatures deemed licensing 
laws to be necessary for the public’s protection, they have seen fit to excuse all 
but a few engineers from licensure. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The partnership of engineers and business is, for pragmatic reasons, here 
to stay.  It not only has been a symbiotic partnership—good for both engineers 
and business—but it has been good for America.  It has produced many 
wonderful products that make life more enjoyable—the likes of smart cars, smart 
phones, and smart TVs.  Business has prospered as engineers have shown it how 
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to make its products wonderful and smart, and business has rewarded engineers 
for the favor. 
But it has come at a high cost—for the public and for engineers.  
Industry has demanded the likes of the industrial exemption and thereby gained 
control of a majority of the engineering that occurs daily in the United States. 
For the public, the price has been the loss of effectiveness of laws 
intended to protect it from incompetent engineers whose work can kill or destroy.  
Among the fallouts of the industrial exemption has been disaster—oil spills, 
unsafe automobiles, and exploding spacecraft. 
For engineers, the price may have been higher.  It has lost its profession.  
In exchange for the partnership’s rewards, engineers have acceded to business 
managers’ penchant for asking their engineer employees to take off their 
engineering hats and to fall into step. 
The wisest man to have lived posed long ago a question that is apt for 
engineers today.  “What good will it be for someone to gain the whole world,” 
Jesus asked, “yet forfeit their soul?”340  What good has it been for engineering to 
have gained the bountiful rewards of business yet to have forfeited its profession? 
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